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Abstract 
Teaching recent history is extremely difficult in the aftermath of terrible injustices. Atrocities 
seem to require not only a retelling in history classes but also an interpretation of what justice 
after atrocity may look like. Scholars in the field of transitional justice have drawn on different 
conceptions of justice for victims, including procedural, distributive and restorative conceptions 
of justice. This critical literature review seeks to understand what relationship there might be 
between history teaching and the variations of transitional justice which incorporate different 
conceptions of justice. After establishing what is meant by ‘procedural’, ‘distributive’ and 
‘restorative’, transitional justice as a broad concept is outlined in the first section. The second 
section compares and contrasts the variations of transitional justice. These two sections lay the 
groundwork for exploring how history teaching interacts with these variations in the third 
section. I first put forward a strong claim about this relationship, stating that only officially 
endorsed transitional justice concepts will determine how history is taught in schools. This 
envisages that ideas of justice will filter down from transitional justice mechanisms such as truth 
commissions into the discourse used by history teachers in the classroom. I find the strong claim 
to be too simplistic and therefore, I suggest a weak claim instead to describe the relationship 
between history teaching and transitional justice. This weak claim states that the shared task of 
transitional justice and history teaching to narrate the past, gives rise to similar concerns and 
challenges for both fields. The review concludes with a suggestion that the fields of history 
teaching and transitional justice could cooperate for a fuller understanding of the ways in which 
the past is leveraged for different purposes. 
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Introduction 
“These are difficult stories. Yet they are important for people to know,” writes Evelyn 
Amony speaking about her time in the Lord’s Resistance Army (2015, p. xxv).  What people 
could do with these difficult stories to make things right is the subject of ‘transitional justice’. 
How to make things right after terrible events is also a question implicit within the teaching of 
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history.  This critical review seeks to understand what relationship there might be between 
history teaching and the variations of transitional justice reflected in transitional justice literature.  
Exploring this relationship adds an important dimension to the discussion on how history 
teaching may shape students’ political understandings (Cole, 2007, p. 115). These educational 
processes exert an invisibilised power and therefore research can act as a valuable vehicle for 
overseeing this power, making it visible. This kind of overseeing is more meaningful when 
history teaching can be located within the context of wider political processes in society, such as 
a process of ‘transition.’ 
Section 1: The Emergence of ‘Transitional Justice’ 
1.1 Three Formulations of Justice  
Transitional justice is not a core addition to the vast philosophical canon on justice. 
Rather, different ideas of justice within the canon are available to scholars and practitioners of 
transitional justice. Three particular formulations of justice are reflected as distinct organising 
principles within transitional justice literature, as will be discussed in Section 2. These are 
procedural justice; distributive justice; and restorative justice. 
Procedural justice theory takes the crux of justice to be the processes for resolving 
conflicts, which emphasises the way decisions are made rather than what outcomes are derived 
for different people (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 5). In other words, theorists identify what an ideal 
arrangement of rules and institutions would be for arriving at decisions (Sen, 2011, pp. 7-8). Key 
to this formulation is John Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’, a thought experiment to facilitate fair 
procedures by making identities held by decision-makers irrelevant to decisions made (2009). 
Following Rawls, an ideal democracy would ensure that no group is formally excluded from 
political office and that equal liberties and opportunities are upheld for all (2009, p. xv, 242). 
Cementing these formal equalities will then remove unfair advantages and allow all members of 
society to legitimately pursue prosperity through competitive market arrangements (Rawls, 2009, 
p. xv, 242; Sen, 2011, p. 64).  
By contrast, distributive justice is not focused on the ways in which decisions are made 
but rather on the particular outcomes of decisions. Distributive justice is concerned with “how a 
society or group should allocate its scarce resources or product among individuals with 
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competing needs or claims” (Roemer, 1998, p. 1). Amartya Sen highlights how resources, not 
merely formal opportunities, are required in order for people “to do what they would like with 
their own lives” (2011, p. 64). Sen notes that Rawls’ ideas would not ensure that different groups 
of people have what they needed in order to exercise choices about their lives (2011, p. 261). 
“Different people, for reasons of personal characteristics, or the influences of physical and social 
environments (…) can have widely varying opportunities to convert general resources (like 
income and wealth) into capabilities – what they can or cannot actually do” (2011, p. 261). 
Therefore, a just distribution would encompass what is made available to people socially, 
culturally and economically with the ultimate vision of a just society as one wherein all people 
can participate equally in social life. 
Restorative justice places affect and relationships at the centre of justice, as opposed to 
rules or resources. Howard Zehr defines restorative justice as “a process to involve, to the extent 
possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address 
harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible” (2002, p. 37). 
The previous formulations of justice are responses to that which is unfair or unequal, objective 
conditions that are abstracted somewhat from the people experiencing them. However, the 
restorative formulation is a response to harms as they are felt; it does not abstract away from 
people’s experiences of injustice or victimisation but instead makes surfacing these central to the 
attainment of justice (Zehr, 2002). Restorative justice therefore locates its goals within the 
subjectivities of the persons involved, aiming to attend to their psychological needs (Zehr, 2002).  
1.2 What does the Concept of Transitional Justice Encompass? 
Through the 1980s and early 1990s, repressive military regimes in Latin America were in 
the process of collapsing while the Soviet Union was losing its control over much of its satellite 
states in Central and Eastern Europe (Balasco, 2013, p. 200). Although possibilities in these 
places were opening up for a different society than what had been, these possibilities were 
inflected with a series of dilemmas: simultaneously navigating, on the one hand, oncoming 
political changes and, on the other, the wounds repression had left in its wake. A number of 
policymakers, lawyers, academics, human rights activists and legal scholars took up these core 
challenges in a succession of interrelated conferences in the eighties and nineties which 
coalesced into the field of transitional justice (Arthur, 2009, p. 325). The term was significantly 
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popularised by Neil Kritz’s 1995 four-volume compilation, Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Arthur, 2009, p. 330). For Kritz, ‘transitions’ 
occurred when undemocratic states democratised, but because it has historically been a matter of 
heated debate across political lines of what constitutes the democratic and the undemocratic,1 this 
is insufficient to understand the conceptual boundaries of transitional justice.  
In order to illuminate the shape of transitional justice’s conceptual boundaries there must 
be an understanding of what is common across transitional justice literature about its aims, foci 
and strategies that distinguishes it from comparable fields. A central commonality is the concern 
with the unjust functioning of a political regime. Transitional justice scholars may describe this 
quality in different terminology, referring to “repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel, 2003, p. 
69), “former regimes” (Kritz in Arthur, 2009, p. 331), “past violations” (Balasco, 2013, p. 200), 
“abuses” (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 352) and “perpetrators” (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 
347). Transitional justice does not take this unjust functioning as only an object to passively 
describe, but rather as something which demands an active response from the field of transitional 
justice.  
The specifics of what constitutes an appropriate response to unjust functioning are 
contested within the literature, but different transitional justice scholars agree that the field 
responds with both a reference to the past and to the future. This distinguishes transitional justice 
from the field of development: 
Buckley-Zistel contends that transitional justice and development share the goal of 
enhancing the well-being of society, but while the former ‘does this by looking 
backwards at past human rights abuses, as well as forwards to a more stable society, 
development does this primarily with a view to the future’ (Balasco, 2013, p. 210).  
The idea of a regard for both the past and the future is developed in the remainder of this section. 
Transitional justice cannot be conflated with responses to regimes which take place whilst 
that regime functions in precisely the same unjust way, such as for example the response of a 
military invasion or a liberation movement. Transitional justice has to concern a period where 
something in this functioning has given way. The form of this varies across context and across 																																																								
1 Contrast the competing claims described by Schumpeter: “there cannot be true democracy except in socialism” 
(2013, 284) and “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” (2013, 297). 
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writers as they refer to the absence of the previous system (the “former regime”) (Balasco, 2013, 
p. 212), the establishment of a new system (the “successor regime”) (Teitel, 2003, p. 75), or the 
reconstruction of the system (the “process of institutional reform”) (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, 
p. 357). Commonly, they merely state that relevant harms (not necessarily the only harms) of the 
system are located in the past (“past human rights abuses” (Balasco, 2013, p. 210), “past 
perpetrators” (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 349), “past abuses” (Teitel, 2003, 78), “past 
conflict” (Teitel, 2003, p. 87),  “past harms” (Teitel, 2003, p. 80), “past suffering and 
wrongdoing” (Teitel, 2003, p. 85). 
Additionally, transitional justice has to be self-conscious about how responses to such 
regimes may have unintended effects in the future, especially regarding how immediate justice 
measures may threaten peace or democracy by causing (further) instability or conflict (Arthur, 
2009, p. 358). The field aims not only to respond to a specific instance of injustice but to 
incorporate a much grander demand for a more just future (Arthur, 2009, p. 358). Therefore 
transitional justice mechanisms are often adjudicated not only in consideration of the particular 
past abuses in isolation but also in consideration of the longer-term consequences of those 
mechanisms, such as reprisal attacks or the political disaffection of certain groups. 
In conclusion, a broad understanding of transitional justice encompasses a wide range of 
contexts, but what these contexts hold in common is a past unjust functioning of a political 
regime. Scholars therefore apply transitional justice to the context of dictatorship, genocide, civil 
war, repression, systemic human rights abuses, economic marginalisation and inter-state warfare.  
Section 2: Contentions in Transitional Justice 
Having attended to the convergences within transitional justice literature, it becomes 
possible to portray its major divergences. In order to determine systemic disagreements from 
idiosyncratic instances of dissent, this section will focus on widely cited authors of intellectual 
histories of transitional justice including those written by Ruti Teitel, Paige Arthur, Louise 
Arbour, Lauren Balasco as well as Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder. Structuring these 
divergences requires returning to the different formulations of justice from Section 1, because at 
the core of the disagreements in the literature are different ideas of justice. 
2.1 Transitional Justice through a Procedural Justice Lens 
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A central difficulty within procedural justice is how to ensure everyone follows the 
prescribed procedures and arrangements (Rawls, 2009, p. 211). Rawls sees the remedy for this 
challenge as an authoritative system of penalties, that is, an impartial legal process (2009, p. 
211). Procedural justice therefore has a close relationship with notions of legality and retribution.  
Through this lens of procedural justice, the unjust functioning of a regime is interpreted 
as evidence that someone must be held to account through a legal process which is what Leslie 
Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder refer to as the legalist approach to transitional justice (2004). Using 
this approach, Ruti Teitel defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with 
periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes” (2003, p. 69). These legal responses take the form of tribunals, 
epitomised by the International Criminal Court. Legal responses to transgressions can however 
be extremely resource-intensive and therefore this approach often concentrates only on a certain 
set of injustices (those categorised as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
torture) and on a certain set of individuals (political elites).  
The focus on a small number of elites is also due to how this approach understands the 
unjust functioning of a regime as a problem residing with certain individuals (or a problem 
individual). Paige Arthur explains this as a matter of trends within academia: “Beginning in the 
early 1970s, structural explanations for social and political development (such as modernization 
theory) were criticized in favour of models that stressed agency and choice - particularly among 
political elites” (2009, p. 338). It is also assumed that future injustices are prevented by focusing 
on specific individuals. “Legalists believed that individual war crime trials would defuse 
intergroup conflict and deter future cycles of violence by removing blame from ethnic groups 
and placing it on individual leaders who could be removed from positions of power” (Vinjamuri 
& Snyder, 2004, p. 348). These ideas supported an unwavering attention to individual 
accountability. 
The individualist focus also foreshadows the outcome this type of transitional justice is 
striving for: liberal democracy. While other types of transitional justice may share a normative 
purpose in ‘promoting democracy’, through the lens of procedural justice this idea of democracy 
is also inflected with “the advancement of liberal political aims” (Teitel, 2003, p. 89). Success 
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for transitional justice is then defined as legal-institutional reform culminating in elections and 
party politics, not necessarily in socioeconomic transformation (Arthur, 2009, p. 347).2  
2.2 Transitional Justice through a Distributive Justice Lens  
A distributive justice lens shifts the focus from international criminal law towards how 
goods have been allocated in society. Rama Mani has used this lens to argue that addressing 
inequalities and deprivation is more important to victims than retribution (2008, p. 255, pp. 264-
265). Similarly, Wendy Lambourne describes how in transitional contexts the resentment 
between groups may intensify further if there is no acknowledgement of the material losses 
disproportionately suffered by certain groups as a result of past abuses (2009, p. 43). She 
demonstrates this with reference to the difficulties faced in many transitional societies by the 
forcibly displaced, by amputees and by those who lost their livelihoods as a result of the 
regime’s injustice (2009, p. 43).  
Rectifying this requires “a proper analysis of the social, cultural and political conditions 
that underlie unequal distributions in the first place” (Novelli, Cardozo & Smith, 2015, p. 10). 
This lens therefore pushes scholars to look at older, structural injustices which are largely 
ignored by legalists (Arbour, 2007, p. 3). Mani describes these structural injustices as “practices 
of discrimination, exclusion and marginalization targeting certain groups or communities 
identified along the lines of ethnicity, race, class, caste, gender, religion or other perceived 
differences” (2008, p. 254). Although scholars may variously cast distributive justice in terms of 
substantive socio-economic rights (Arbour, 2007, p. 7), social justice (Mani, 2008, p. 255) or 
combating oppression (Mani, 2008, p. 265) all these terms speak to matters of marginalisation.  
Advocates of this approach envisage transitional justice responses with a greater 
emphasis on reparations programs, on post-conflict economic reconstruction packages and on 
longer-term socio-economic policies (Arbour, 2007, p. 20). Crafting these requires systematising 
knowledge about structural injustices, and therefore Louise Arbour emphasises that truth 
																																																								
2 Balasco cites Lundy and McGovern to put this point in more geopolitical terms: “transition, as normally conceived 
in this body of literature, is limited to a western, liberal conception of justice based on the tenets of democracy. They 
further argue that ‘the assumption that ‘‘transition’’ implies a move away from dictatorship and to democracy 
ignores the problem that human rights abuses may continue to take place in circumstances where, in theory at least, 
the norms of liberal democratic accountability prevail’” (Lundy & McGovern in Balasco, 2013, p. 201).  
CORERJ: Cambridge Open-Review Educational Research e-Journal   	www.corerj.educ.cam.ac.uk 
ISSN 2056-7804  
Vol. 4, 2017 	
 8 
commissions3 should collate a broad historical analysis that forms the basis on which to 
redistribute goods in society (2007, p. 14). 
In contrast to the individualist packaging of the procedural lens, distributive justice 
chiefly operates at the level of groups (Arbour, 2007, p. 3). Arbour asserts “an approach solely 
focused on individual victims of such crimes would offer inadequate support for many other 
people who had been (…) affected by political violence and were marginalized and excluded” 
(2007, p. 19). This wider effort can include education reform as reparation in order to redress 
inequalities in access to education preceding the conflict and resulting from the conflict (Arbour, 
2007, pp. 17-18). Scholars within this approach argue that their greater emphasis on redress 
differentiates their own project from that of traditional development actors and policymakers 
(Arbour, 2007, p. 20).4   
This type of transitional justice employs a different hypothesis of what causes the 
recurrence of injustice to that of procedural justice. Distributive justice advocates believe that in 
order to prevent recurrence it is more important to eradicate systematic discrimination and 
inequality than to establish individual accountability (Arbour, 2007, p. 8). Deprivation, 
unemployment, loss of land and lack of access to education and housing are interpreted as the 
underlying causes of conflict and are given greater weight than the agency of individual political 
elites (Mani, 2008, p. 253, 259).  This in turn creates a different understanding of the role of 
transitional justice, which is to attack the inequalities that are the source of grievances (Arbour, 
2007, p. 8). 
2.3 Transitional Justice through a Restorative Justice Lens 
While victims are positioned as beneficiaries within distributive justice approaches to 
transitional justice, they are not necessarily positioned as participants in constructing that justice. 
Without their participation there is a threat that the psychological needs of victims will remain 
																																																								
3 Truth commissions are official bodies, generally authorised by governments, which document and report on a set 
of past injustices which occurred within a specified timeframe (Teitel, 2003, p. 78). 
4 Mani goes further to distance the distributive justice project from development by claiming that traditional 
development actors’ “overriding priority is rapid economic growth and integration into global markets, which tends 
to have aggravating consequences for the most vulnerable and worst-off in society, who often belong to the very 
groups that suffered the brunt of war” (2008, p. 264). 
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unspoken and unmet. Meeting these psychological needs is the primary concern of transitional 
justice through a restorative lens.  
This approach theorises an “intimate connection between cognition and emotion in 
appraising political situations and deciding how to act” (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 358). In 
other words, emotions have powerful political consequences. Regimes become persecutory, 
particularly through ethnonational politics, because they are enacting the emotions of resentful 
groups and therefore pre-emptively speaking through these emotions is crucial to deter future 
injustices (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, pp. 357-358). “Eliminating the conditions that breed 
atrocities depends on achieving an emotional catharsis in the community of victims and an 
acceptance of blame by the perpetrators” (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 357).  
Instead of aiming, in the first instance, to address resentments through a distribution of 
goods, this approach seeks to create a more direct “release valve for resentments” (Vinjamuri & 
Snyder, 2004, p. 358). This release valve often takes the form of truth commissions (Teitel, 
2003, p. 78). Within this approach, truth commissions are thought to be fora where victims can 
tell their stories and have their experiences officially acknowledged and vindicated (Vinjamuri & 
Snyder, 2004, p. 357). They are presented as therapeutic spaces capable of effecting 
psychological compensation (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 357). They can also be a signal of 
willingness to forgive and reconcile, a call for “a new relationship between former enemies” with 
the ultimate aim of redefining socio-political identities into a cohesive nation state (Teitel, 2003, 
p. 77; Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 358).  
The restorative justice lens can operate either at the level of individuals (direct victims 
and perpetrators) or at the group level because it essentially has a relational focus without 
prescribing the units of that relationship. Teitel argues that restorative justice grapples with both 
“dialogue between victims and their perpetrators” as well as questions of “how to heal an entire 
society” (2003, p. 77, 80). An example of this multidimensionality is the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation commission where the dialogue centred on individual victims and 
perpetrators, but these hearings were broadcast to the nation for the purpose of engaging the 
wider social groups to which these victims and perpetrators belonged (Minow, 1998, p. 326). 
2.4 Procedural Justice Dominance in the Field 
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Procedural justice has been the most successful in characterising mainstream transitional 
justice (Sharp, 2014, p. 159). Like saying ‘Hoover’ for ‘vacuum cleaner’, the particular form has 
become interchangeable with the broader category. The procedural justice approach and its 
teleology towards liberal market democracy have been propagated by US-driven globalised 
justice institutions (Sriram, 2007, pp. 585-586). The approach is highlighted in powerful realms 
which frame the work of actors all over the world, such as within United Nations Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace (Sharp, 2014, p. 153). This 
conception of justice has become a useful instrument to naturalise the post-Cold War 
triumphalism which relegates distributive justice to a failed historical project, the out-dated 
runner-up to a winning formula of liberal market democracy that has heralded ‘the end of 
history’ (Fukuyama, 2006; Sharp, 2014, p. 156). 
To justify downgrading distributive justice during transitions, proponents of procedural 
justice claim that bringing perpetrators to account and satisfying an abstract moral need (and a 
presumed popular need) for vengeance will clear the way for development (Arbour, 2007, p. 10). 
This top-down prioritisation of retribution also subsumes restorative justice processes because it 
positions trials and punishments as adequate mechanisms for satisfying the emotional needs of 
victims (Kritz, 1995, p. 185). 
However, the dominance of procedural justice has not been uncritically accepted in all 
quarters. Postcolonialists have slated the large, expensive justice ventures in the Global South 
which valorise the Global North as heroes or rescuers and which whitewash their complicity in 
creating the deep structural pressures that precipitate violence (De Vos, Kendall, & Stahn, 2015, 
p. 50; Mutua, 2001, p. 204). Moreover, they question the relegation of distributive justice 
because they see development in the Global North not as a predictable function of liberal market 
democracies which can be painlessly recreated in the Global South, but as a continuing dividend 
of asset-stripping the Global South (Young, 2016, pp. 50-56). Following this logic, Mahmood 
Mamdani argues that an exclusive focus on procedural justice merely delays the question of 
distributive justice (in Hamilton, 2001). 
In addition to this geopolitical critique are the concerns of people who have themselves 
been directly disappointed by these institutions of ‘big justice.’ Many women activists and 
marginalised groups in particular have rejected this model because it does not speak to their local 
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or psychological needs (Lambourne, 2016). This model of justice which prioritises punishment 
of elites does not reflect their primary concerns which are around their families, their children’s 
education, the crimes committed against their own families, endemic sexual violence in the 
community, enduring the on-going effects of poverty and the lack of infrastructure in the 
transitional environment (Lambourne, 2016). The inability of this model to recognise 
community-level atrocity means that for many survivors it is not fit for purpose.  
Section 3: Transitional Justice and History Teaching 
The previous section explained three different approaches to transitional justice and 
concluded with a description of the discontentment with mainstream, procedurally-focused 
transitional justice. This variance in what transitional justice could be to different people is 
problematic for teachers who have the responsibility of narrating periods of transition to 
students. If justice (or the lack thereof) is part of that narrative, there is a question of which 
justice teachers would emphasize. Therefore the following section seeks to explore the 
relationship between transitional justice concepts and history teaching. This exploration begins 
with a fundamental challenge of understanding this relationship: the lack of explicit articulation 
between transitional justice and (history) education. 
All three approaches that have been outlined in the preceding section make reference to 
needing to uncover ‘the truth’ of past injustices. A motif across transitional justice literature is 
that the exposure of the truth, whether through trials and/or truth commissions, helps prevent 
future political violence and other injustices (Arthur, 2009, p. 356; Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 
348, 357; Teitel, 2003, p. 78).5 However there is frequently no vision at all for how ‘truth’ is 
disseminated because of the assumption that a trial or truth commission in and of itself is 
sufficient to ensure that the facts of past injustice are uncovered, disseminated, publically 
recognised and that these facts ‘set the historical record straight’ (Arthur, 2009, p. 535; Teitel, 
2003, p. 77; Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, pp. 348-349, 357, 355). These mechanisms are 
insufficient to influence a popular understanding of past injustices in that trials are often 
conducted at a distance from the wider public sphere, while commissions’ reports are often long 
and dense (Cole, 2007, p. 122). There is therefore a continuous need to recreate spaces of 																																																								
5 However there are dissenting transitional justice scholars who argue that truth-telling carries too high a risk of 
compromising immediate stability (Balasco, 2013, p. 203). 
CORERJ: Cambridge Open-Review Educational Research e-Journal   	www.corerj.educ.cam.ac.uk 
ISSN 2056-7804  
Vol. 4, 2017 	
 12 
deliberating about the past and its meanings, especially for young people and other audiences 
who did not access the discussions prompted by transitional justice mechanisms during those 
mechanisms’ public life. 
Yet transitional justice literature does not investigate the relationship between transitional 
justice and the institutions which continue the work of truth-telling in the long-term, such as 
history education. According to Elizabeth Cole, “education, while often invoked when the topic 
of ‘never again’ is raised, has been largely absent from the transitional justice discourse. Neither 
the larger education system nor the teaching of history – both what is taught and how – has been 
considered” (2007, p. 115). Despite this lack of consideration, schools and history teaching are 
inevitably sites where truth-telling about past injustice is continued. While works produced by 
professional historians are also vehicles of truth telling, these lack the reach of schooling which 
is “where history becomes more concrete and relevant to non-elites” (Cole, 2007, p. 120). 
Schools are where many young people first and foremost experience the (in)justice of their wider 
society and may also develop their political understandings (Cole, 2007, pp. 120-121,126). The 
messages they receive at school are thought of as authoritative with history textbooks presenting 
an official version of the past (Cole, 2007, pp. 120-121, 123). Not only does history education 
construct an official past, but it also constructs a promised future that is in the making (Cole, 
2007, p.  123), which is of direct relevance to the discussion in Section 2 about what constitutes a 
just future. This is the invisibilised power of educational processes referred to in the 
Introduction. 
As both transitional justice and history teaching are such crucial arenas for ‘dealing with 
the past’, a relationship between them must exist even if such a relationship is not explicitly 
recognised in the transitional justice literature. To explore what this relationship may be, I first 
invent a strong claim about this relationship, that is, a claim which poses a proposition as certain 
and requires robust evidence to justify the proposition.  
I propose the strong claim that a direct relationship exists where the nationally dominant 
concept of transitional justice determines the discourse of history teaching. This seems plausible, 
in that, trials and commissions create an official historical record imbued with their own version 
of justice and thereafter that historical record over-determines the contents of what is taught in 
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history. Thus these authoritative narratives from transitional justice mechanisms prescribe what 
are appropriate ways of thinking about justice in schools.  
This claim can be illustrated with examples from each transitional justice approach. The 
major response to the Rwandan genocide was the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, embodying an emphasis on procedural justice. This emphasis on procedural justice 
is reflected in the discourse of history teaching in post-genocide Rwanda which does not 
elaborate on issues of ethnic identity (Paulson, 2011, p. 3), issues which are largely irrelevant to 
realizing procedural justice. However, having the language to speak of social divisions such as 
ethnicity is a necessity for realising distributive and restorative justice. Conversely, as 1930s 
China was attempting to transition out of an unjust imperialist regime, it displayed a preference 
for distributive justice (Zarrow, 2015). During this time the discourse of history teaching and 
textbooks espoused not only an anti-colonial nationalism but also stressed the importance of “the 
satisfaction of people’s economic needs”, land distribution and limits on capital (Zarrow, 2015, 
p. 115, 118-119). More recently, South Africa adopted a restorative justice model creating one of 
the most well-known truth commissions in the field of transitional justice (Teitel, 2003, p. 78). 
Motifs of restorative justice echo across South Africa’s history teaching discourse with official 
policy documents stating that “more than any other discipline, good History put to good use 
taught by imaginative teachers can promote reconciliation” (Brookbanks, 2014, p. 92).6 These 
examples could supply reason to believe that transitional justice concepts flow directly from 
initial transitional justice mechanisms into how history is taught in schools. 
However there are several problems with the direct relationship, the straightforward 
causal sequence, proposed in the strong claim. Firstly, the similarities it identifies between 
national transitional justice responses and history teaching discourse may be a case of 
correlation, not causation, as similar macro-political forces could be acting separately on the two 
spheres. That is, the same evidence from Rwandan, Chinese and South African history teaching 
could be interpreted as confirmation that the same formulations of justice which are available to 
transitional justice are also available to history teaching, and not necessarily that the former 
determines the latter. If, for example, there was a similarity in the use of restorative discourse in 																																																								
6 The document in question is the text that underpinned education reform in post-apartheid South Africa, “The 
Manifesto On Values, Education and Democracy.” See Brookbanks (2014). 
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history education and transitional justice mechanisms this may be due to the influence of 
restorative justice on both spheres and not due to transitional justice influencing history teaching.  
Secondly, the idea that a particular interpretation of justice is transplanted from initial 
transitional justice mechanisms into the education field, ignores the possibly divergent influence 
of multiple actors. These actors have the power to separately influence the discourses of history 
education in ways that may not accord with official, national transitional justice discourses. 
These actors include the international entrepreneurs of Education For All, Universal Primary 
Education and Millennium/Sustainable Development Goals who frame education policy and 
programs in terms of economic productivity and efficiency (Novelli, Cardozo & Smith, 2015, p. 
7). Novelli, Cardozo and Smith argue that this framing has been to the exclusion of highlighting 
restorative goals (such as reconciliation and social cohesion) as well as distributive goals (such 
as the rectification of inequalities) within post-conflict education systems (2015, p. 7). Therefore 
even in a society where transitional justice mechanisms have emphasised the need for material 
redress and eradicating systemic discrimination, history education can conceivably be geared by 
international actors towards less radical or emotive targets such as enhancing problem-solving 
skills and employability. 
Even if education policy reflects ideas of justice that do align with the ideas of justice 
embedded in national transitional justice mechanisms, particular schools and teachers can still 
resist what is prescribed as just in dominant transitional justice discourse or by international 
actors. These latter actors can create prescriptions and educational materials but they cannot 
comprehensively monitor how such topics are discussed within schools. As Julia Paulson 
intimates, while researchers “have focused on the kinds of narratives that are ‘making it’ into 
educational materials – it is equally important to understand if, how and to what effect these 
materials are being used in classrooms” (2011, p. 4). A study of teachers in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
demonstrated that teachers would use learning materials and historical narratives which accorded 
to their own political allegiances, rather than merely repeating what was officially prescribed 
(Myers, 2007, p. 10). There are therefore actors at multiple levels influencing how ideas of 
justice for the past are imparted in the classroom, ideas which may be different from those 
marketed by a country’s dominant transitional justice mechanism. 
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Taking into account these criticisms, it may be more feasible to make a weak claim about 
the relationship between transitional justice and history teaching. This weaker claim poses a 
more indirect, indeterminate relationship and requires less evidence to justify it. The weak claim 
I invent here is that, as transitional justice concepts and history teaching are both choreographing 
a sensitive process of truth telling after past injustices, they therefore share a similar set of 
concerns. Two of these concerns will be explored here.  
As discussed in Section 1 all three transitional justice concepts are concerned with ‘how 
to treat an unjust past in a way that allows for a more just future?’ Similarly, Cole (2007) argues 
in relation to school history that “understandings of history are crucial to a society’s ability to 
reckon with the difficult past for the sake of a more just future” (p. 123). What is at issue then for 
both transitional justice and history teaching is the question of ‘what must follow 
acknowledgement of the past to cement a better future?’ History teaching cannot leave abuses 
merely drifting in the narrative, ‘hanging in the air’, with no comment on how such abuses have 
been or should be approached. An emotive textbook chapter demands a concluding paragraph 
that alludes to some form of resolution of abuses, direction away from abuses or a hint of what a 
just future would look like. 
Similar strategies to those of the different transitional justice approaches are available to 
history teaching to navigate this question.7 The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance 
produced a 2010 paper which suggested that teachers should reassure students that the world has 
become safer since the Holocaust due to the development of international criminal law (p. 18). 
Teachers are to discuss how “numerous completed cases demonstrate to the international 
community that even highest-ranking political and military leaders can, irrespective of their 
possible immunity, be charged for the most serious crimes” (2010, p. 18). The punishment of 
political elites is positioned in this text as the central means of creating closure for victims and 
encouraging reconciliation between groups (2010, p. 18). 
In comparison to this procedural justice approach to the concern, teachers can also adopt 
a distributive justice approach. Activist teachers in Porto Alegre infuse their history teaching 
with discussions of how unequal social-class relations in the present day must be confronted 																																																								7	Although	only	procedural	and	distributive	strategies	are	discussed	here,	see	Bekerman	and	Zembylas	(2011)	for	an	exploration	of	restorative	justice	approaches	to	teaching	history	after	atrocity.	
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(Myers, 2007, p. 20). They used Marxist, feminist and anti-racist historical analyses to explain 
what changes society still needed to undergo in order for different groups to participate equally 
with others (Myers, 2007, pp. 11-12). One teacher illustrates how teaching about the Landless 
People’s Movement in Brazil is a distributive issue of both the past and of the present: “It is 
already a debate, a big debate, concerning Brazil. This theme of private property, which is a 
historical theme, has to do with power, with political power in Brazil, like the great landowners. 
These landowners are in conflict with a great portion of the peasant population” (Myers, 2007, p. 
11). This approach urges new generations to demand greater equality and suggests to them what 
a direction towards justice would look like. 
The second shared concern between transitional justice and history teaching is that it is 
too often the case that the way the past is treated serves to entrench existing power structures and 
does not give voice to marginalized groups. The critique explored in reference to transitional 
justice in the conclusion of Section 2 is mirrored in critiques of history teaching.  Cole suggests 
that it is dangerous for history to be “limiting the point of view presented to that of traditional 
power holders” (2007, p. 119) but this is not uncommon. Due to the institutional and financial 
alliances between the discipline of history and state authorities, national histories are often 
political instruments, “master narratives about the past started to be put together to justify the 
present social organization” (Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, 2015, p. 7). This 
is borne out in research reflecting history education’s role in justifying the existence of the nation 
state, in demonizing marginalized ethnicities (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2001, p. 84, 125) and in 
justifying the role of women in society (Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, 
2015). 
Where this shared concern between transitional justice and history teaching becomes 
most apparent is in how both implicitly make statements as to whose truth counts and whose 
truth is silenced. Transitional justice mechanisms construct official victims who are incorporated 
into those mechanisms and erase other victims who are not. History teaching that is prescribed 
by the state also carries the imprimatur of the state and therefore also constructs legitimate, 
official victims of injustice and does not recognise injustices beyond those boundaries. This is 
illustrated in Bekerman and Zembylas’ (2001) observation of the contrasts between the treatment 
of the tragedies of the Jewish community and the treatment of the tragedies of the Palestinian 
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community in a bilingual school in Israel. They found that while “Jewish students seem to attach 
themselves to a narrative that presents the Holocaust and the mourning of its victims as unique” 
and are supported in that narrative in the classroom, Palestinians students engaging with “the 
present-day suffering and mourning of the Palestinian community” could not receive the same 
support for their narrative (pp. 157-160). A series of choices in the school environment had 
highlighted some victims as more deserving than others with the effect of reinforcing the 
hegemonic narrative of the state. 
The weak claim is therefore useful in highlighting how both transitional justice and 
history teaching are enmeshed in the complexities of looking to the past for the sake of the future 
and how both are challenged to do this in a way that secures a more just future for all, not only 
for those who already hold power in society. 
Conclusion 
Just as there are dilemmas for transitional justice in piecing together the implications of 
atrocities, so too are there dilemmas for those teaching about atrocity. The problems of teaching 
history invite transitional justice scholars and practitioners to extend their thinking to consider 
the intergenerational life span of truth-telling mechanisms. History teaching should be 
recognised as a crucial element of truth-telling by transitional justice scholars and, if appropriate, 
be afforded institutional support by transitional justice practitioners. Equally, those interested in 
how to teach painful histories can make use of the contestations between variations of 
transitional justice for the purpose of reflection. In particular, these contestations helpfully tease 
out beliefs about how a just society might look and through what mechanisms that justice could 
be realized. Such debates can deepen classroom discussion and directly engage young people in 
the on-going political reconstruction of their wider community. Further research considering the 
linkages between these fields should explore the conceptions of justice reflected in official 
prescriptions for history education, discourses of justice employed in the classroom by history 
teachers and students’ experiences of these class discussions. Research of this kind could foster a 
holistic understanding of how the past can be used to promote a collective imagining of how to 
create a just society for all or be used to conserve power and erase the disempowered. This 
project however demands that both fields expand their idea of the system of memory they are 
engaging in.  
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